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Abstract We extend recently documented evidence that diversified firms hold significantly less 
cash than specialized firms to consider differences in how diversified and specialized firms adjust 
their cash flows to achieve their target cash balance. We find that diversified firms have higher 
free cash flows as a result of equal operating cash flows and lower investment in comparison to 
specialized firms. Diversified firms save less cash by placing less reliance on external financing; 
by issuing less debt and equity, and distributing higher cash dividends. Our findings support the 
hypothesis that diversified firms are able to hold less precautionary cash as they are in better 
position to finance investment opportunities internally from operating cash flows.  
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1 Introduction  
Recent studies show that corporate diversification is a key determinant of a firm’s precautionary 
cash balance. Diversified firms who operate in more than one industrial segment hold 
approximately 50% less cash than specialized firms operating in a single industry (see Duchin 
2010; Subramaniam et al. 2011). These studies conclude that diversified firms maintain lower 
precautionary cash balance because imperfect correlation of investment opportunities and cash 
flows across diversified firms’ divisions facilitates the coordination of internal financing and 
investment.  
While these studies provide answers to the question of why diversified firms hold less 
cash, they are silent on the important issue of how this lower precautionary cash balance arises. 
The focus of this paper is to bridge this gap by investigating the components that drive annual 
changes in cash balance. We define the annual change in a firm’s cash balance as net cash flow, 
which is comprised as the sum of net cash flows from operations, investment and financing. 
Examining the individual components of cash flow allow us to better differentiate between 
agency costs of overinvestment and precautionary savings motives for accumulation of cash 
holdings over time. 
We propose two explanations for the lower cash balance and retention of cash flows in 
diversified firms. Our first hypothesis is that lower net cash flow in diversified firms is the 
outcome of lower free cash flow (FCF), defined as operating cash flow minus investing cash 
flow, in comparison to specialized firms. Under this overinvestment hypothesis, diversified firms 
retain lower cash balances than specialized firms because they invest more of their operating 
cash flow. If operating cash flow is insufficient to cover investment then diversified firms can 
also raise external financing more easily than specialized firms (Lewellen 1971; Stulz 1990).1 
                                                 
1 Lewellen (1971) argues that imperfect correlations between divisions’ cash flows may increase debt capacity by 
reducing default risk. Stulz (1990) provides a theoretical model in which lower cash flow volatility due to 
diversifications may reduce information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and consequently moderate 
frictions in issuing equity. 
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Our alternative hypothesis is that lower net cash flow in diversified firms is the outcome 
of larger or equal FCF relative to specialized firms. Under this precautionary savings hypothesis, 
operating cash flow in diversified firms is sufficiently large to cover investment demand without 
the need to raise external financing, which allows diversified firms to accumulate lower 
precautionary cash balances.  
Using a sample of US firms from 1990 to 2009, we confirm that the cash balance of 
diversified firms is half that of specialized firms. In addition, we show that mean and median 
annual net cash flow in diversified firms is also half of that seen in specialized firms, indicating 
that diversified firms hold less cash because they accumulate cash at a slower rate than 
specialized firms.  
Examining the components of net cash flow, we find that diversified and specialized 
firms generate comparable levels of operating cash flow. However, diversified firms invest less 
and use less external financing relative to specialized firms. Our research findings highlight that 
diversified firms can, on average, fully cover their investment spending from internally generated 
operating cash flows. As a result, FCF is insignificantly different from zero for diversified firms. 
By contrast, we find that specialized firms cannot support their investment activities from 
operating cash flow and must rely on external financing to cover the deficit. The mean (median) 
ratio of financing cash flow to total assets in specialized firms is 6% (0.3%) compared to 0.8% (-
1.2%) in diversified firms. This finding highlights an important paradox in the results of Duchin 
(2010); specialized firms accumulate cash balances at a significantly faster rate than diversified 
firms, despite an internal financing deficit at the average specialized firm. 
To examine financing cash flow in more detail we separate its components between net 
debt financing, equity issuance, and cash payouts to equity investors. We find that diversified 
firms accumulate lower cash reserves by issuing less net debt and equity, and paying more cash 
to equity investors through dividends, relative to specialized firms. The difference of net debt 
(equity) issued is equivalent to 0.5% (0.47%) total assets. Diversified firms pay higher cash 
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dividends, but there is no net difference in total payout between specialized and diversified firms. 
These results are robust to controls for endogeneity, additional control variables, and controls 
for unobservable heterogeneity through industry and time fixed effects.  
Our research findings extend the literature on cash and liquidity management in several 
ways. First, we examine how diversified firms maintain lower levels of cash through management 
of annual cash flows. Recent studies show that diversified firms hold less cash because 
diversification facilitates better coordination of internally generated cash flows and investment 
opportunities (see Duchin 2010; Subramaniam et al. 2011). Directly examining how firms spend 
and save cash flows enhances our understanding of competing overinvestment and 
precautionary savings explanations of why diversified firms accumulate lower cash balances. We 
show that lower investment expenditure relative to internally generated operating cash flow is a 
key factor that contributes to reducing demand for precautionary cash in diversified firms 
(Keynes 1936; Bates et al. 2009; Kim et al. 1998; Opler et al. 1999; Anagnostopoulou 2013). 
Second, our findings reveal an important insight for specialized firms. Specialized firms 
have negative FCF, on average, because they invest more than they earn from operations. 
Despite this, we show that specialized firms accumulate cash at twice the rate observed for 
diversified firms because they are able to raise cash through the external financing channel. 
These findings support the precautionary motive for holding cash – these firms accumulate and 
retain financing cash flows to fund future investment opportunities and to protect against 
unexpected future shocks to operating cash flow.  
Third, the research shows how diversified (specialized) firms actively use external capital 
markets to adjust their cash balance over time given their higher (lower) internally generated 
annual free cash flows. Specialized firms actively raise debt and equity capital to finance 
investment requirements and to accumulate cash over time. Diversified firms do not require 
external debt and equity to finance investment spending, and make higher dividend payouts to 
equity investors to manage annual net cash flows downwards and accumulate cash at a slower 
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rate than observed for specialized firms. This distinction is important given the role of 
transaction costs, information asymmetry and agency considerations when raising capital in 
external markets.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related 
literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our 
empirical results. Section 5 provides a summary of robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Related literature and hypothesis development  
Our research is motivated by the findings that diversified firms hold less cash and accumulate 
cash at a slower rate over time than specialized firms (see Duchin 2010; Subramaniam et al. 
2011). We extend this earlier research to show how diversified companies maintain their lower 
cash balance and accumulation over time. We investigate this by considering the underlying 
difference in net cash flow and the inputs to net cash flow; defined as operating, investing and 
financing cash flows, between specialized and diversified firms.  
Operating cash flowi,t, Investing cash flowi,t, and Financing cash flowi,t are net cash generated from 
or used in operating, investing and financing activities in year t respectively. The sum of these 
cash flows is defined as Net cash flowi,t, where net cash flow is the annual change in cash balance. 
The difference between operating cash flow and investing cash flow is termed Free cash flowi,t. Our 
research predictions are developed from a basic accounting relation of net cash flow and its 
components.  
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡) + 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡           (1) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡                                                                    (2) 
 
Focusing on the cash flow statement allows for a straightforward view of how cash flow 
is broken down across sources and uses of cash at the firm level. Given the finding of Duchin 
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(2010) that diversified firms hold less cash and accumulate cash at a slower rate over time, we 
expect that diversified firms have lower net cash flow than specialized firms. We propose two 
competing hypotheses to explain the lower net cash flow of diversified firms.  
First, the lower cash balance in diversified firms can be the outcome of lower free cash 
flow relative to specialized firms. Under this hypothesis, lower free cash flow can arise because 
diversified firms generate lower operating cash flows relative to specialized firms or because they 
invest more (Denis and Siblikov 2010). The literature provides neither strong theoretical 
arguments nor clear empirical evidence that diversified firms generate less operating cash flow 
than specialized firms (Melicher and Rush 1973; Weston and Mansinghka 1971). Hund et al. 
(2010) find that diversified firms actually have higher profitability than specialized firms.  
Alternatively, the ability to pool cash flows from different operating divisions allows 
diversified firms to self-finance investment projects without the need to raise finance in external 
capital markets. The ability to raise cash in internal capital markets can lead to overinvestment 
problems in diversified firms given the lack of external market monitoring (Jensen 1986; Inderst 
and Muller 2003; Ruland and Zhou 2005). As such, we expect that any difference in free cash 
flow between diversified and specialized firms under our first hypotheses is driven by higher 
investment spending in diversified firms. 
In the event that annual free cash flow is negative, diversified firms can use their easier 
access to external capital markets to finance a sustained period of negative cash flow. Diversified 
firms are expected to have greater access to external capital markets than specialized firms 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1992). Stulz (1990) develops a theoretical model in which lower cash flow 
uncertainty due to diversification reduces the cost of underinvestment. This can arise because 
shareholders will be more credibly convinced to provide new capital when a firm’s expected and 
realized cash flows are less likely to be significantly different.2 Lewellen (1971) argues that the 
                                                 
2 Hadlock et al. (2001) empirically support the argument by showing that equity issues by diversified firms are 
viewed less negatively than those of specialized firms. 
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imperfect correlations between divisions’ cash flows may increase debt capacity of firms by 
reducing the probability of default.3  
This leads us to posit: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Free cash flow in diversified firms is less than free cash flow in specialized firms. 
Hypothesis 1b. Financing cash flow in diversified firms is greater than financing cash flow in 
specialized firms. 
 
We refer to this first hypothesis as the overinvestment hypothesis. 
Alternatively, the lower cash balance in diversified firms can be the outcome of free cash 
flow that is greater than or equal to free cash flow in specialized firms. When operating cash flow 
is sufficient and stable to cover investment, the precautionary saving theory introduced in 
Keynes (1936) and Kim et al. (1998) suggests that firms do not need to save cash as they can 
finance investments from low-cost operating cash flow. This can arise whereby ongoing 
operating cash flows in diversified firms are greater than or equal to operating cash flow in 
specialized firms and/or because investing cash flows in diversified firms are less than or equal 
to investing cash flows in specialized firms. 
If free cash flow at diversified firms is greater than or equal to free cash flow at 
specialized firms it must also hold that diversified firms have lower financing cash flow relative 
to specialized firms.4 Rather than retain cash, diversified firms achieve the lower cash balances 
documented in Duchin (2010) by using free cash flow to pay back debt or distribute to 
shareholders through stock repurchases and dividends. This results in diversified firms having 
                                                 
3 Dimitrov and Tice (2006) and Peyer (2002) provide empirical evidence supporting this argument.  
 
4 Denis and Siblikov (2010) set out an extreme scenario in which firms with low cash flow and limited access to 
external finance are forced to have less cash as they are unable to accumulate cash reserves and/or are forced to 
drain previously accumulated cash reserves. However this is less likely the case for diversified firms, who we expect 
to have greater access to external capital markets given their lower risk and larger asset base.  
 
7 
 
lower financing cash flow than specialized firms.5 This is consistent with Duchin (2010) whereby 
the imperfect correlation of cash flows and investment opportunities within diversified firms 
facilitates the use of operating cash flow to self-finance investments and allows diversified firms 
to retain lower precautionary cash balances. This reduces the precautionary demand for cash 
holdings within diversified firms. 
We posit: 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Free cash flow in diversified firms is not less than free cash flow in specialized 
firms. 
Hypothesis 2b. Financing cash flow in diversified firms is less than financing cash flow in 
specialized firms. 
 
We refer this second hypothesis as the precautionary saving hypothesis. 
We examine these competing hypotheses by investigating differences in the components 
of annual net cash flows between diversified and specialized firms.  
 
3 Sample data 
The sample includes all US firms available from Worldscope covering the 20-year period from 
1990 to 2009. All sample data is CPI-adjusted to year 2000 dollars. Firm and segment level data 
on assets, capital expenditure, depreciation, operating income, and SIC codes are extracted from 
Worldscope. Thompson Financial is used to retrieve cash flow data.  
Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we exclude financial and utility firms but do not 
exclude firms with financial segments. Furthermore, all firm-year observations with missing 
segment SIC codes or market capitalization of less than $10 million are removed from the 
                                                 
5 Under the pecking order model of Myers (1984), given the higher cost of external financing relative to internal 
financial resources, firms will choose to fund all projects using available internal finance before accessing to 
progressing to external financing sources. Empirical evidence of the negative relation between internal and external 
financing is provided in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Acharya et al. (2007). 
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sample. We also require that sample firms do not have cash holdings, any cash flow components, 
or total long-term debts larger than the value of total assets. To ensure the integrity of segment 
data, only firm-year observations with sum of segment sales within 1% of firm’s total sales are 
kept in the sample. The final sample includes 34,869 firm-year observations for 4,560 firms.  
Following prior literature, we define a specialized firm as one that operates in a single 2-
digit SIC industrial segment. Diversified firms are those who operate in more than one 2-digit 
SIC industrial segment. We report all additional variable definitions in Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the core variables used in this study. 29.6% of 
firm-years are diversified and the median firm reports two industrial segments. The mean 
(median) cash balance of 19.2% (9.6%) corresponds closely with the descriptive statistics of 
Bates et al. (2009) over a similar time period.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The positive value for average net cash flow indicates that sample firms have 
accumulated cash holdings over the sample period. However, this has been achieved through 
external financing rather than retentions from internally generated FCF. The average firm 
finances investments equivalent to 8.7% of assets each year, which is financed through operating 
cash flow equivalent to 5.9% of assets and financing cash flow equivalent to 4.4% of assets. The 
residual is retained as net cash flow, which is equivalent to 1.6% of total assets per annum.  
Our subsequent regression analysis examines the determinants of the components of 
firm cash flows. We base our regression models on Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009) and 
Duchin (2010) who examine the determinants of a firm’s cash holdings. We omit control 
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variables from the regression models examined in these studies that are captured by our 
dependant cash flow variables, including dividend payments and capital expenditures. We control 
for firm size to proxy for a firm’s access to external capital markets (Opler et al. 1999). Firm size 
is also positively correlated with firm age, which we expect is related to investment opportunities 
and demand for external capital. Tobin’s Q is used to proxy for investment opportunities and is 
defined following Duchin (2010). Leverage is also expected to be correlated with the cost and 
ability to raise external finance (Almeida and Campello 2010; Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2014). 
Return on Assets (ROA) is used to control for profitability, which we expect to be correlated 
with operating cash flow and the demand for external financing. When examining the 
determinants of net investing and financing cash flow, we additionally control for lagged net 
working capital and cash holdings and contemporaneous operating cash flow, which indicate the 
pre-existing stock of internal funding (Hill et al. 2014). Year and 2-digit SIC industry dummies 
are included in all regression models to absorb industry and time-specific effects that are 
expected to be correlated with a firm’s investment opportunities and availability of external 
financing (Opler et al. 1999).  
One concern in our regression analysis is correlation amongst explanatory variables. 
Table 3 presents pairwise correlations or our dependent and explanatory variables. As expected, 
several cash flow components are mechanically correlated given their definition. For example, 
free cash flow is positively and negatively correlated with operating and investing cash flow 
respectively. Correlations amongst the explanatory variables are all below 0.5. We also estimate 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) for our explanatory variables and find that no individual VIF is 
above 2. Collectively, these findings suggest that multicollinearity does not affect our subsequent 
regressions analysis.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
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4 Differences in cash flows between specialized and diversified firms  
4.1 Univariate analysis of differences in cash flow across diversified and specialized firms 
Looking at cash flow components in diversified and specialized firms provides an initial 
overview of differences in these firms’ financial management policy and how these firms have 
adjusted their cash flows to maintain their observed cash position. Accordingly, Table 4 reports 
firms’ cash flow components for the sub-sample of 10,309 diversified firm-year observations 
relative to the sub-sample of 24,560 specialized firm-year observations. We compare mean and 
median differences in cash and cash flows across each group of firm year observations.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
We confirm the finding of lower cash holdings in diversified firms relative to specialized 
firms (see Duchin 2010; Subramaniam et al. 2011). The mean (median) of ratio of cash holdings 
to total assets for specialized firms is approximately double the corresponding figure for 
diversified firms.6 Importantly, the annual speed of accumulating cash in specialized firms is also 
twice that of diversified firms. The mean (median) ratio of net cash flow to total assets in 
specialized firms is 1.9% (0.4%) compared to 0.8% (0.2%) in diversified firms.7  
To study how the components of firm level cash flows vary between specialized and 
diversified firms we separate cash flows between operating, financing and investing cash flows. 
Consistent with Hund et al. (2010), we find higher operating cash flows of 8% for diversified 
firms relative to 5.1% for specialized firms. These preliminary results are consistent with 
hypothesis 2a that FCF in diversified firms is greater than or equal to FCF in specialized firms 
and support the precautionary saving hypothesis.  
                                                 
6 In an unreported analysis, we confirm the finding of a negative relation between cash holdings and corporate 
diversification in a regression analysis after controlling for a series of variables outlined in Opler et al. (1999).  
 
7 Our unreported analysis shows that average ratio of net cash flows to total assets in specialized firms is larger than 
diversified firms in 17 out of 20 years during the period 1990-2009. Additionally, during this 20 year period, net cash 
flow is positive in 18 years for specialized firms and 17 years for diversified firms. 
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Our univariate results also highlight that specialized firms accumulate cash at a quicker 
rate, despite lower free cash flows, through greater use of financing cash flow. The mean 
(median) ratio of financing cash flow to total assets in specialized firms is 6% (0.3%) compared 
to 0.8% (-1.2%) in diversified firms. Specifically, diversified firms’ lower financing cash flows are 
the result of issuing significantly less equity and distributing higher cash payouts. On average, 
annual gross equity issuance is 8.1% of total assets in specialized firms while it is just 3.1% total 
assets in diversified firms. Moreover, average net equity issuance and dividend payouts in 
diversified firms are equal to 1.2% of total assets. Specialized firms, in contrast, rely heavily on 
external equity to finance their investment spending. Net equity issuance in specialized firms is, 
on average, equal to 6.1% total assets while dividend payouts equal 0.9% of their assets. These 
univariate statistics are consistent with hypothesis 2b that financing cash flow in diversified firms 
is less than financing cash flow in specialized firms.  
Overall, the results from our univariate analysis suggest that (i) during the period 1990-
2009, both diversified and specialized firms have been increasing their cash balances; and (ii) the 
rate of cash building in specialized firms is more than double that in diversified firms. Diversified 
and specialized firms actively adopt distinct financial policies to manage their cash balance. 
Despite their FCF deficit, specialized firms raise external debt and equity financing to both 
finance investment spending and to accumulate cash on the balance sheet at a faster rate than 
observed for diversified firms. 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis of differences in cash flow across diversified and specialized firms 
We extend our analysis to estimate regressions of the determinants of cash flows and relate these 
to firm diversification and other control variables known to be correlated with firm level cash 
flows (see Almeida and Campello 2010; Denis and Sibilkov 2010; Gatchev et al. 2010). Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and we control for unobservable heterogeneity through 
industry and time fixed effects. These results are presented in Table 5.  
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INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
We find no significant difference in operating cash flows between diversified and 
specialized firms in Model 1 while Models 2 and 3 show that both investment and financing cash 
flow in diversified firms is significantly lower than the corresponding figures for specialized firms. 
This confirms that specialized firms do not accumulate cash more quickly than diversified firms 
because they generate higher level of operating cash flows nor because they invest less. 
Combining operating and investing cash flow, model 4 shows that FCF in diversified firms is 
significantly higher than FCF in specialized firms. These findings support hypotheses 2a (higher 
FCF) and 2b (lower financing cash flow) for differences in cash flow between diversified and 
specialized firms the precautionary saving hypothesis for lower cash holdings and accumulation 
in diversified firms. 
These differences are also economically significant. The mean difference of free cash 
flow (financing cash flow) between diversified and specialized firms is equivalent to 1.08% 
(1.12%) of firms’ total assets. The difference in investing cash flow between these firms is also 
non-trivial in economic terms and is equivalent to 0.78% value of total assets. 
For our control variables we find that Tobin’s Q is positively correlated with investment 
spending and therefore negatively related to FCF. Q is also positively related to financing cash 
flow, suggesting that firms with valuable investment opportunities are more likely to raise 
external financing. Financing cash flow is negatively related to firm size, suggesting that larger 
firms are more likely to finance investments from internally generated cash flows. Firm size is 
also positively related to operating cash flow. We find general support for the pecking order 
model of project financing given the negative relation between financing cash flow and both 
lagged cash balance and operating cash flow, and the positive relation between leverage and both 
investing and financing cash flow. 
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Taken together, our findings show that diversified firms have higher FCF than 
specialized firms as they generate the same level of operating cash flow but invest less. Despite 
lower FCF, specialized firms accumulate cash at a quicker rate than diversified firms through 
higher net financing cash flows. Our findings complement Duchin (2010) who shows that 
greater coordination of cash flows and investment opportunities contributes to lower 
precautionary cash holdings in diversified firms. We find that lower investment expenditure, 
both in absolute terms and relative to operating cash flow is also a factor that according to 
precautionary motivation of saving cash contributes to reduced demand for cash in diversified 
firms (Bates et al. 2009; Kim et al. 1998; Opler et al. 1999).  
 
4.3 Differences in financing cash flow between specialized and diversified firms 
Our work in the previous section highlights that actively raising external financing allows 
specialized firms to accumulate cash more quickly than diversified firms despite negative 
internally generated FCF. Our findings also fail to support an agency cost of free cash flow 
hypothesis that diversified firms retain less cash due to overinvestment in value destroying 
projects.  
This section extends our previous analysis to examine the individual components of 
financing cash flow identified by Dittmar and Duchin (2010) and Gatchev et al. (2010) as 
channels for firms to adjust their cash ratio, in a multivariate format. Separating financing cash 
flow between debt and equity raised and cash paid out through dividends and repurchases also 
allows us to distinguish between competing explanations of diversified firms’ lower financing 
cash flow. We propose that diversified firms choose to raise less external financing cash flow. 
However, as a counter argument, it also possible that diversified firms are less able to raise 
finance externally. If diversified firms do have more difficulty in accessing external capital 
markets to raise cash they would likely compensate by paying lower dividends than specialized 
firms. Therefore, observing a higher level of cash payouts to equity investors would reject the 
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limited external finance explanation and suggest that diversified firms actively choose to maintain 
lower financing cash flow. Table 6 presents the results obtained from the estimation of these 
models.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Our empirical results favor the proposition that diversified firms choose to issue less 
debt and equity, but at the same time pay higher dividends to investors. We find that diversified 
raise less cash through debt issuance, and both gross and net equity issuance, whilst paying 
higher dividends to equity investors. The differences are again significant in both statistical and 
economic terms. The difference of net debt issuance is equivalent to 0.5% of total assets while it 
is equal to 0.47% of total assets for net equity issuance. Our results suggest that specialized firms 
use both debt and equity financing to finance the free cash flow shortfall identified previously 
and to accumulate cash on the balance sheet. Debt and equity are of similar economic 
importance relative to book value of assets. 
The difference in dividend payouts between diversified and specialized firms is less 
pronounced, but remains statistically significant and is equivalent to 0.14% of total assets. This is 
consistent with studies of payout policy that find dividends are paid by firms with more 
predictable cash flows (e.g. Guay and Harford 2000). The imperfect correlation of cash flows 
across the segments of diversified firms allows for greater stability in dividend payouts. 
Diversified firms spend less on the repurchase of their own shares than specialized firms 
although the difference is insignificant. 8  Total cash payouts are also statistically indifferent 
between both types of firm, highlighting that dividend payments from steady operating cash flow 
at diversified firms drive any differences in payout policy between the two groups of firms. 
                                                 
8 The finding that specialized firms repurchase more shares than diversified firms is consistent with arguments made 
in several studies on payout policy (see Jagannathan et al. 2000). Stock repurchases are viewed as a more suitable way 
to distribute profits in firms with less stable earning streams.  
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Among control variables, firm size is positively related to access to both debt and equity 
financing, and with payout policy through both dividends and repurchases. Cash holdings are 
positively related to cash payouts and dividends are increasing with ROA. Consistent with the 
pecking order theory, operating cash flow is positively related to total payouts but is negatively 
related to the demand for debt and equity financing. 
Summarily, our research suggests that diversified firms choose to maintain a lower cash 
balance by issuing less debt and equity capital and by distributing more cash as dividends relative 
to specialized firms. This extends the findings of Duchin (2010) by highlighting the channels 
through which diversified firms adapt their financial policy to maintain their lower cash balance.  
 
5 Robustness tests 
This section presents a summary of additional analysis and robustness testing that we have 
carried out to ensure the validity of our core findings.  
 
5.1 Change of cash flow characteristics around diversification decision 
A concern with our core analysis in Table 5 is simultaneity or reverse causality between past 
accumulation of cash holdings and the ability to become diversified through greater investment 
spending. Anderson et al. (2011) find that firm risk changes surrounding diversifying acquisitions 
and we expect this will also have implications for the precautionary demand for cash holdings. 
To address this concern we identify a sub-sample of firms that choose to become 
diversified, which we define as companies moving from a single industrial segment to more than 
one industrial segment in a given year (year t). For these cases, we examine mean and median 
changes in the components of net cash flow from one year prior (t-1) to one year following (t+1) 
the decision to become diversified. We exclude the diversification year to avoid any mechanical 
effects of the decision to become diversified, such as an increase in investment expenditure to 
acquire diversifying business assets. Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. 
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INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Consistent with the precautionary theory of cash holdings, diversifying firms reduce cash 
holdings in the year following the decision to diversify. For firms that become diversified, we 
find no change in operating cash flow and a reduction in investment spending, and as a result an 
increase in FCF, which supports hypothesis 2a. Firms also place less reliance on external finance 
in the year following the decision to become diversified, which supports our hypothesis 2b. Both 
findings are consistent with the precautionary motive for cash holdings. The differences in our 
key cash flow components are significant at the 5% level or better in all cases. 
 
5.2 Alternative definitions of cash flow and diversification variables 
We also examine the robustness of our results in Table 5 to the definition of cash flow and 
diversification variables. Table 8 reports the analyses with various alternative specifications using 
Table 5 as the base.  Panel A keeps the dependent variables from Table 5 and uses the number 
of segments to proxy for corporate diversification as in Lang and Stulz (1994). Panel B uses 
alternative dependent variables the diversification dummy used in our earlier testing. In Panel B 
we replace operating cash flow with net income plus depreciation, investing cash flow with 
capital expenditures, and thus free cash flow as the difference between the two. Financing cash 
flow is replaced by the total of net equity and debt issuance, following Almeida and Campello 
(2010). In Panel C these new dependent variables are regressed on the number of segments. For 
brevity, we omit the coefficients for control variables and present only results for the proxy of 
firm diversification. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
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Results from the table are largely consistent with our findings in Table 5. In Panel A, 
when number of segments is used to represent firm diversifications, the coefficients of the 
variables are similar in terms of significance level and magnitude to those reported earlier, 
suggesting that diversified firms have higher FCF than specialized firms, and lower investing and 
financing cash flow. In Panels B and C where alternative measures of cash flow components and 
different proxies for firm diversification are utilized, all results remain consistent with Table 5.  
These findings confirm our earlier result that diversified firms have higher level of free 
cash flow as they have similar level of operating cash flow and lower level of investing cash flow 
in relative to specialized firms.  
 
5.3 Effect of firm size and R&D expenditure  
Duchin’s (2010) analysis emphasizes the important role for the functioning of internal capital 
markets in the relation between diversification and cash holdings. We expect that the functioning 
of these internal markets is also correlated with both firm size and research and development 
(R&D) expenditure and we examine this issue in Tables 9 and 10 respectively.  
Table 9 replicates the core findings from Table 5 separately for large (Panel A) and small 
firms (Panel B). Large firms are defined as firm-years in the upper quartile of book value of total 
assets and small firms are those in the lowest three quartiles of book value of assets. 9 Our 
findings on the core relation between corporate diversification and the components of net cash 
flow are consistent across both panels. We again find a negative relation between diversification 
and both investing and financing cash flow, and a positive relation between diversification and 
free cash flow. This confirms that our earlier support for hypotheses 2a and 2b is not a result of 
spurious correlation arising from the impact of firm size on diversification and the functioning 
of internal capital markets.  
 
                                                 
9 Our results are unchanged if we define large firms as those with book value of assets above the sample median. 
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INSERT TABLES 9 AND 10 HERE 
 
Pinkowitz et al. (2015) argue that R&D intensive firms have incentives to hold more cash 
to hedge against future underinvestment risks. Lyandres and Palazzo (2015) show that increases 
in cash holdings in recent years are driven almost exclusively by innovative and R&D intensive 
firms. We examine this issue in more depth here. Table 10 replicates our findings separately for 
firms with positive R&D values and those with zero R&D values. Following Opler et al. (1999) 
firm years with missing R&D values are treated as zero values in our analysis. Approximately 
27% of firm years have positive values for R&D data and we present results for these findings in 
Panel A. Panel B reports our findings for firms with zero R&D expenditure.  
Focusing on R&D firms in Panel A, we again find that diversified firms invest less and 
make less use the financing cash flow channel than specialized firms. Operating cash flows in 
diversified firms are lower than for a specialized firm, which leads to no difference in free cash 
flow between diversified and specialized firms. However, our key finding that specialized firms 
invest greater amounts than diversified firms and finance this through greater use of external 
financing remains. Our results for non-R&D firms in Panel B are identical to those presented in 
Table 5. Diversified firms are characterized by lower investing cash flow, higher FCF and lower 
financing cash flow relative to specialized firms.  
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper examines the link between corporate diversification, corporate liquidity and financial 
management by investigating the differences in cash flow components between diversified and 
specialized firms. Duchin (2010) and Subramaniam et al. (2011) document significantly lower 
cash holdings and annual accumulation of cash in diversified firms. This paper asks how 
diversified firms manage their cash flows to maintain this lower rate of cash accumulation.  
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Using a sample of 34,869 US firm-year observations from 1990 to 2009, we find that 
diversified firms generate a similar level of operating cash flow and invest less than specialized 
firms. Operating cash flow in diversified firms is sufficient to fully cover investment demand, 
suggesting that diversified firms make a strategic choice to save less cash within the firm, rather 
than because they generate less cash within the firm. We show that diversified firms have lower 
cash balances because they make less use of external financing relative to specialized firms. More 
specifically, we show that diversified firms raise significantly less debt, less equity, and distribute 
higher cash dividends than specialized firms. Specialized firms accumulate cash at a quicker rate 
despite investing more than internally generated operating cash flow. They achieve this through 
raising debt and equity in external capital markets to cover investment spending and accumulate 
cash on the firm’s balance sheet. 
Our results confirm the important assumption underlying the work of Duchin (2010) 
that diversified firms have lower optimal level of cash holdings because they are in better 
position to internally finance investments from operating cash flow. We also show that in 
addition to greater coordination of cash flows and investment opportunities, lower investment 
expenditure in diversified firms is a factor that according to the precautionary motivation for 
cash holdings contributes to reduce demand for cash in these firms.  
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Table 1 Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Diversification  Dummy variable that takes a value of one for diversified firms and 
zero for specialized firms  
Segments A count of the number of industrial segments that represent 10% 
or more of firm consolidated revenues  
Specialized firms  Firms with segment(s) operating in only one two-digit SIC code  
Diversified firms Firms operating in more than one two-digit SIC code 
Cash/assets  Cash and short-term investments /total assets 
Cash flow/assets (Income before extraordinary items + depreciation and 
amortization)/total assets 
Net operating cash flow/assets Net cash receipts and disbursements from operating activity 
representing the sum of cash flow, extraordinary items and other 
operating cash flow /total assets 
Net cash flow/assets Change in cash and short-term investment from one year to the 
next/total assets 
Other operating cash flow/assets Net change in working capital excluding changes in short term 
borrowings and changes in cash /total assets 
Net investing cash flow/assets Net cash receipts and disbursements resulting from capital 
expenditures, disposal of fixed assets, increase in other assets and 
other investing activities /total assets 
Capex/assets Capital expenditure / total assets 
Acquisition/assets Assets acquired from acquisitions or mergers/total assets 
Assets sale/assets Amount received from the sale of property, plant and equipment 
/total assets 
Free cash flow (FCF)/assets Net operating cash flow/assets – Net investing cash flow/assets  
Net financing cash flow/assets Net cash receipts and disbursements resulting from changes in long 
or short term debt, proceeds from sale of stock, stock repurchased, 
dividends paid and other financing activities/total assets 
Net debt issuance/assets (Long-term debt issuance – long-term debt reduction)/total assets 
Gross equity issuance/assets Sale of common and preferred stocks/ total assets 
Net equity issuance/assets (Sale of common and preferred stocks - purchase of common and 
preferred stocks)/total assets 
Repurchases/assets Purchase of common and preferred stocks/total assets 
Dividend/assets Cash dividends for common stocks/total assets 
Payout/assets (Cash dividends + purchase of common and preferred 
stocks)/total assets 
Firm size Natural logarithm of book value of total assets  
Tobin’s Q  Market value of assets (total assets+ market value of common 
equity – common equity − deferred taxes)/(0.9*total assets + 0.1* 
market value of assets) 
Leverage (Debt in current liabilities + long-term debt)/ total assets 
Net working capital (NWC)/assets (Current assets − current liabilities − cash)/ total assets 
Return on Assets (ROA) (Net income/ total assets)*100 
 
This table describes the definition of variables used in this paper. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard deviation 
Number of 
observations 
Diversification 0.296 0.000 0.456 34,869 
Segments 2.062 2.000 1.454 34,869 
Cash/assets 0.192 0.096 0.225 34,869 
Cash flow/assets 0.048 0.086 0.182 34,869 
Net operating cash flow/assets 0.059 0.083 0.156 34,832 
Net cash flow/assets 0.016 0.003 0.132 34,836 
Net investing cash flow/assets 0.087 0.066 0.150 34,832 
Free cash flow/assets -0.028 0.006 0.192 34,829 
Net financing cash flow/assets 0.044 0.000 0.197 34,830 
Firm size 5.655 5.546 1.899 34,869 
Tobin’s Q 1.853 1.514 1.095 34,869 
Capex/assets 0.063 0.042 0.076 34,850 
Leverage 0.198 0.159 0.193 34,846 
Repurchases/assets 0.018 0.000 0.055 34,416 
Dividend/assets 0.010 0.000 0.035 34,791 
Payout/assets 0.028 0.003 0.068 34,366 
NWC/assets 0.097 0.085 0.196 34,674 
Return On Assets (ROA) -0.001 0.042 0.185 34,869 
 
This table contains summary statistics for a sample of nonfinancial and nonutility US firms from 1990 to 2009 with 
non-missing segment data and total market capitalization greater than $10M. Data is taken from Worldscope and 
Thomson Financial. Firms with any of cash flow components, cash holdings or total long-term debt greater than 
total assets are excluded from the sample. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 
 
Cash / 
assets 
Cash flow 
/ assets 
Net cash 
flow / 
assets 
Net 
operating 
cash flow 
/ assets 
Net 
investing 
cash flow 
/ assets 
Free cash 
flow / 
assets 
Net 
financing 
cash flow 
/ assets 
Diversifi-
cation 
Firm size 
Tobin’s 
Q 
Capex / 
assets 
Leverage 
Dividend 
/ assets 
Payout / 
assets 
NWC / 
assets 
Cash flow/assets -0.289                
Net cash flow/assets 0.231  0.133               
Net operating cash flow/assets -0.254  0.770  0.194              
Net investing cash flow/assets -0.033  0.144  -0.189  0.216             
Free cash flow/assets -0.182  0.516  0.306  0.649  -0.603            
Net financing cash flow/assets 0.332  -0.413  0.376  -0.500  0.460  -0.767           
Diversification -0.198  0.098  -0.038  0.085  -0.034  0.096  -0.120          
Firm size -0.325  0.300  -0.031  0.322  0.021  0.246  -0.260  0.278         
Tobin’s Q 0.377  -0.096  0.165  -0.089  0.115  -0.163  0.270  -0.129  -0.237        
Capex/assets -0.173  0.108  -0.060  0.148  0.356  -0.157  0.112  -0.028  0.017  0.025       
Leverage -0.431  -0.027  -0.075  -0.009 0.034  -0.034  -0.017  0.136  0.271  -0.237  0.088      
Dividend/assets -0.046  0.153  -0.041  0.168  -0.047  0.174  -0.197  0.043  0.100  0.063  -0.009 -0.014    
Payout/assets -0.002  0.219  -0.063  0.261  -0.096  0.288  -0.323  0.027  0.146  0.117  -0.021  -0.046  0.571    
NWC/assets -0.282  0.249  -0.042  0.088  -0.067  0.124  -0.149  0.018  -0.034  -0.213  -0.141  -0.097  0.003 -0.048   
ROA -0.248  0.975  0.150  0.734  0.134  0.496  -0.381  0.100  0.299  -0.081  0.047  -0.044  0.149  0.214  0.285  
 
This table presents pairwise correlations of dependent and explanatory variables for our sample of nonfinancial and nonutility US firms from 1990 to 2009 with non-missing 
segment data and total market capitalization greater than $10M. Data is taken from Worldscope and Thomson Financial. Firms with any of cash flow components, cash holdings or 
total long-term debt greater than total assets are excluded from the sample. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
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Table 4 Cash flow differences between diversified and specialized firms 
 
 
Specialized firms Diversified firms T- 
statistics of 
difference 
in means 
Wilcoxon P-
value Variable names Mean Median Mean Median 
Cash/assets 0.221 0.126 0.124 0.060 39.140*** <.0001***  
     
  
Net cash flow/assets 0.019 0.004 0.008 0.002 7.180***  <.0001***  
       
Net operating cash 
flow/assets (A) 
0.051 0.079 0.080 0.088 -15.940***  <.0001***  
Cash flow/assets 0.036 0.083 0.075 0.091 -18.390***  <.0001***  
Other operating cash 
flow/assets 
-0.015 -0.010 -0.013 -0.009 -2.180** 0.071* 
       
Net investing cash 
flow/assets (B) 
0.091 0.068 0.080 0.063 6.550***  <.0001***  
Capex/assets 0.065 0.041 0.060 0.043 5.410***  <.0001***  
Acquisition/assets 0.025 0.000 0.029 0.000 -5.380***  <.0001***  
Asset sale/assets 0.010 0.000 0.014 0.001 -5.820***  <.0001***  
       
Free cash flow/assets 
(FCF) 
-0.040 0.000 0.000 0.019 -18.180***  <.0001***  
       
Net financing cash 
flow/assets (C) 
0.060 0.003 0.008 -0.012 22.590***  <.0001***  
Net debt issuance/assets 0.007 0.000 0.009 0.000 -1.390 0.602 
Gross equity 
issuance/assets 
0.081 0.007 0.031 0.004 25.250***  <.0001***  
Net equity issuance/assets 0.061 0.002 0.012 0.000 23.910***  <.0001***  
Repurchases/assets 0.018 0.000 0.019 0.000 -1.040 <.0001***10 
Dividend/assets 0.009 0.000 0.012 0.001 -8.040***  <.0001***  
Payout/assets 0.027 0.000 0.031 0.001 -5.010***  <.0001***  
 
This table reports a comparison of mean and median cash flows across diversified and specialized firms. Positive 
(negative) items in sections (A) and (C) with the exception of cash payouts to equity investors through dividends or 
repurchases represent cash inflows (outflows). Positive (negative) items in section (B) represent cash outflows 
(inflows) with the exception of asset sales. All variables are defined in Table 1. The Wilcoxon p-value is the 
probability value of a Wilcoxon test of the hypothesis that the two samples have same underlying distribution.  
***, ** and *, indicate that differences are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
  
                                                 
10 This indicates that median repurchase payout in diversified firms is statistically larger that in specialized firms. 
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Table 5 Diversification and cash flow components 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Dependent 
Variable 
Net operating cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net investing cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net financing cash 
flow/assets 
 Free cash flow/assets 
Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. Est.  Est. t Value 
Intercept 0.666 0.670   -3.719 -1.410   -3.746 -1.270   -27.950 -4.120  *** 
Diversification -0.089 -0.550   -0.779 -4.170  ***  -1.127 -5.690  ***  1.077 5.150  *** 
Firm size 0.979 17.530  ***  -0.007 -0.120   -0.353 -5.440  ***  0.857 12.890  *** 
Tobin’s Q 0.069 0.700   1.789 14.850  ***  3.123 20.760  ***  -1.818 -12.900  *** 
Leverage -0.738 -1.510   8.016 12.330  ***  7.847 10.940  ***  -6.007 -8.590  *** 
ROA x 100 0.586 62.490  ***  -0.016 -1.610   -0.001 -0.090   0.468 46.730  *** 
Lagged 
NWC/assets     1.563 2.750  ***  1.421 2.150 **     
Lagged 
Cash/assets     2.870 4.540  ***  -1.550 -2.280 **     
Net operating 
cash flow/assets     0.265 19.760  ***  -0.545 -37.740 ***     
Year fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
R-Square 0.581    0.146    0.319    0.299   
N Obs 34,809    30,109    30,109    34,806   
 
This table reports regressions of the determinants of cash flows. These models use OLS regression with year and 
industry fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
***, ** and *, indicate that estimates are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6 Distribution of financing cash flow 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Dependent Variable 
Net debt issue/assets  Net equity issue/assets  Gross equity issue/assets Repurchase/assets  Dividend/assets  Payout/assets 
Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value 
Intercept -5.012 -10.060 ***  3.815 1.300   -0.650 -0.210   -4.394 -8.100 ***  -0.252 -0.800   -4.646 -6.050 ***  
Diversification -0.501 -3.890 ***  -0.472 -2.960 ***  -0.552 -4.350 ***  -0.088 -0.890   0.140 2.360 **  0.052 0.440  
Firm size 0.388 5.980 ***  2.835 19.570 ***  3.480 26.080 ***  0.628 8.130 ***  0.310 6.440 ***   0.938 9.990 ***  
Tobin’s Q 0.319 8.080 ***  -0.581 -10.760 ***  -0.313 -7.560 ***  0.266 7.330 ***  0.095 3.540 ***   0.361 7.970 ***  
Leverage 13.416 21.720 ***  -6.268 -11.160 ***  -6.060 -13.690 ***  0.157 0.420   -0.548 -2.160 **  -0.390 -0.840  
ROA x 100 0.061 8.700 ***  -0.074 -8.420 ***  -0.069 -8.590 ***  0.005 1.630   0.006 2.420 **  0.012 2.790 *** 
Lagged NWC/assets 3.721 8.180 ***  -2.385 -3.700 ***  -3.109 -5.180 ***  -0.763 -2.820 ***   0.381 2.280 **  -0.381 -1.160  
Lagged Cash/assets 4.056 8.600 ***  -5.095 -8.250 ***  -2.758 -4.900 ***  2.266 8.030 ***  0.315 1.990 **  2.580 7.960 *** 
Net operating cash flow/assets -0.125 -14.300 ***  -0.333 -26.720 ***  -0.250 -23.860 ***  0.082 11.600 ***  0.027 6.760 ***   0.109 13.640 ***  
Year fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
R-Square 0.090    0.275    0.294    0.122    0.082    0.147   
N Obs 29,162    29,162    29,162    29,162    29,162    29,162   
 
This table reports regressions of the determinants of individual components of financing cash flows. These models use OLS regression with year and industry fixed effects and 
standard errors are clustered at firm level. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
***, ** and *, indicate that estimates are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 7 Changes in cash flow surrounding the decision to diversify 
 
 
Net operating cash 
flow/assets 
Net investing cash 
flow/assets 
Net financing cash 
flow/assets 
Free cash 
flow/assets 
Mean difference 0.002 -0.019***  -0.040***  0.021***  
Median difference 0.000 -0.004** -0.009***  0.011***  
N Obs 642 642 642 642 
 
This table reports changes univariate analysis of changes in cash flows for companies that diversify. We define a 
diversifying firm as one that previously operated in a single industrial segment to one that now operates in more 
than one segment. Increases in the number of segment occur at year zero and changes in cash and cash flows are 
reported over the period t-1 to t+1. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
***, ** and *, indicate that differences are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively for a two sample t-
test of difference in means and a Wilcoxon sign rank test of the median difference. 
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Table 8 Robustness test for different measures of cash flows’ components and firms’ diversifications 
 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
Panel A: Firm diversification measured as the number of Segments 
Dependent Variable 
Net operating cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net investing cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net financing cash 
flow/assets 
 
Free cash 
flow/assets 
 Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value 
Segments -0.097 -1.910 *  -0.205 -3.570 ***   -0.304 -4.870 ***   0.159 2.450 ** 
Panel B: Alternative definition of cash flow components 
Dependent Variable Cash flow /assets 
 
Capex/assets  
External finance 
/assets  
Free cash flow 
/assets 
 Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value 
Diversification  0.041 0.470  -0.456 -3.440 ***   -0.988 -5.160 ***   0.483 3.910 ***  
Panel C: Firm diversification measured as the number of Segments and alternative definition of cash flow components 
Dependent Variable Cash flow /assets 
 
Capex/assets  
External finance 
/assets  
Free cash flow 
/assets 
 Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. t Value 
Segments 0.038 1.260  -0.148 -3.640 ***   -0.252 -3.990 ***   0.188 4.780 ***  
 
This table reports regressions of the determinants of cash flows. The regressions presented are similar to those 
presented in Table 5 but change the dependent cash flow components and/or replace Diversification with Segments as 
the main explanatory variable. We report only the results for the main explanatory variable of the impact of firm 
diversification on cash flow components. All control variables and regression statistics are omitted for brevity. These 
models use OLS regression with year and industry fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at firm level. All 
variables are defined in Table 1.  
***, ** and *, indicate that estimates are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 9 Diversification and cash flow components for large and small firms 
 
Panel A: Firm years with book value of total assets in the upper quartile 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Dependent 
Variable 
Net operating cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net investing cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net financing cash 
flow/assets 
 Free cash flow/assets 
Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. Est.  Est. t Value 
Intercept 8.019 7.070 ***  0.329 0.160  1.702 0.880  1.625 0.740 
Diversification -0.075 -0.550  -0.765 -3.090 ***   -0.942 -3.820 ***   0.855 3.310 ***  
Firm size -0.108 -1.670 *  -0.598 -5.380 ***   -0.666 -5.910 ***   0.650 5.720 ***  
Tobin’s Q 3.128 20.730 ***   1.123 4.750 ***   1.729 6.640 ***   0.853 3.440 ***  
Leverage -4.549 -9.410 ***   9.911 10.850 ***   9.798 10.450 ***   -11.482 -12.390 ***  
ROA x 100 0.262 12.100 ***   -0.053 -2.410 **  -0.056 -2.890 ***   0.230 8.990 ***  
Lagged 
NWC/assets     3.633 3.970 ***   4.417 4.590 ***      
Lagged 
Cash/assets     6.342 4.950 ***   2.513 1.920 *     
Net operating 
cash flow/assets     0.320 12.630 ***   -0.573 -22.720 ***      
Year fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
  
R-Square 0.407    0.158    0.221    0.149   
N Obs 8,797    8,238    8,238    8,797   
Panel B: Firm years with book value of total assets in the lowest three quartiles 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Dependent 
Variable 
Net operating cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net investing cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net financing cash 
flow/assets 
 Free cash flow/assets 
Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. Est.  Est. t Value 
Intercept -1.254 -1.210   -6.766 -1.950 *  -8.253 -2.260 **  -33.070 -5.510 ***  
Diversification 0.294 2.000 **  -0.648 -3.200 ***   -1.069 -5.000 ***   1.263 5.490 ***  
Firm size 1.391 19.400 ***   0.713 8.350 ***   0.471 5.030 ***   0.379 3.730 ***  
Tobin’s Q -0.033 -0.390   2.050 16.640 ***   3.623 25.130 ***   -2.162 -16.260 ***  
Leverage -0.227 -0.490   6.828 9.940 ***   6.143 8.190 ***   -4.530 -6.320 ***  
ROA x 100 0.587 73.640 ***  -0.011 -1.110   0.003 0.260   0.476 50.380 ***  
Lagged 
NWC/assets     0.821 1.430   0.333 0.490      
Lagged 
Cash/assets     1.927 2.830 ***  -2.773 -3.880 ***      
Net operating 
cash flow/assets     0.250 18.750 ***   -0.545 -39.250 ***      
Year fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
R-Square 0.594    0.149    0.329    0.306   
N Obs 25,998    21,861    21,859    25,995   
 
This table reports regressions of the determinants of cash flows separately for large and small firms. Large firms are 
identified as those in the largest quartile of book value of total assets. Small firms are identified as those in the 
lowest three quartiles of book value of total assets. These models use OLS regression with year and industry fixed 
effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
***, ** and *, indicate that estimates are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 10 Diversification and cash flow components for large and small firms 
 
Panel A: Firm years with a positive value for R&D expenditure 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Dependent 
Variable 
Net operating cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net investing cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net financing cash 
flow/assets 
 Free cash flow/assets 
Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. Est.  Est. t Value 
Intercept -6.297 -8.030 ***   -0.920 -0.370  3.886 1.530  23.273 21.250 ***  
Diversification -0.526 -2.400 **  -0.775 -2.550 **  -0.867 -2.680 ***   0.333 0.980 
Firm size 0.154 1.000  1.821 9.090 ***  3.127 14.090 ***   -2.002 -9.280 ***  
Tobin’s Q 1.178 15.260 ***   0.231 2.610 ***  -0.250 -2.670 ***   0.870 8.950 ***  
Leverage 0.564 38.840 ***   -0.024 -1.290  0.031 1.930 *  0.441 26.530 ***  
ROA x 100 -2.298 -2.780 ***   6.433 5.300 ***  7.570 5.740 ***   -5.565 -4.590 ***  
Lagged 
NWC/assets     2.377 2.080 **  2.435 2.110 **     
Lagged 
Cash/assets     3.905 3.380 ***  -1.086 -0.950     
Net operating 
cash flow/assets     0.276 11.070 ***  -0.511 -21.460 ***     
Year fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
  
R-Square 0.579    0.124    0.272    0.277   
N Obs 9,496    8,261    8,261    9,495   
Panel B: Firm years with a zero value for R&D expenditure 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Dependent 
Variable 
Net operating cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net investing cash 
flow/assets 
 
Net financing cash 
flow/assets 
 Free cash flow/assets 
Est. t Value  Est. t Value  Est. Est.  Est. t Value 
Intercept 3.420 4.700 ***   -4.269 -2.850 ***   -4.367 -2.670 ***   -20.069 -4.500 ***  
Diversification 0.063 0.470   -0.672 -3.600 ***   -1.073 -5.530 ***   1.260 5.920 ***  
Firm size 0.013 0.150   1.806 13.860 ***   3.145 20.180 ***   -1.811 -12.900 ***  
Tobin’s Q 0.837 17.410 ***   0.035 0.600   -0.215 -3.430 ***   0.670 9.900 ***  
Leverage 0.593 65.010 ***  -0.013 -1.210   -0.015 -1.250   0.481 44.960 ***  
ROA x 100 -0.064 -0.150   8.436 13.040 ***   7.722 10.980 ***   -5.831 -8.430 ***  
Lagged 
NWC/assets     1.323 2.380 **  1.067 1.570      
Lagged 
Cash/assets     2.640 3.630 ***   -1.659 -2.120 **     
Net operating 
cash flow/assets     0.259 18.720 ***   -0.555 -37.180 ***      
Year fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
  
R-Square 0.583    0.151    0.332    0.301   
N Obs 25,313    21,851    21,849    25,311   
 
This table reports regressions of the determinants of cash flows separately for firm-years with research and 
development (R&D) expenditure and firm-years with zero R&D expenditure. We define firm years with missing 
R&D expenditure and zero R&D firm-years. These models use OLS regression with year and industry fixed effects 
and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
***, ** and *, indicate that estimates are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
